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THE INEQUALITY OF SACRIFICE
REDUCING MORAL HAZARD FOR BAILED-OUT




A. Mortgage Relief in Context: The Historical Connection between Debt and Labor
Should distressed homeowners be required to perform community service
in order to receive federal aid that reduces their mortgage debt? The mortgage
crisis was caused by an upsurge in risky lending practices . As a remedy, the
U.S. Treasury Department is offering to bail out nine million homeowners with
low interest rate loans while paying off their costlier debt.2 A second program
modifies mortgages by writing off debt.
3
My study focuses on the unconditional grant of government largess for
these borrowers. These borrowers meet qualification standards, but are not
obligated to repay the large personal savings that these programs generate. My
research is motivated by the inequality of sacrifice that surrounds this bailout.
As the U.S. funds bailouts for powerful companies and aid for the poor, it
requires sacrifice and additional effort by recipients.4 But a subsidy of $50
Professor, School of Labor and Industrial Relations and College of Law, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
1. See Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, Quick Slide Show on the U.S. Housing Market, at
http://dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2006/elO611.html, Chart 5 ("Rising Use of Multiple, Interest-
Only and Negative Amortization Mortgages in the U.S."). The share of home buyers using more
than one mortgage rose from about 5% in 1985-1995 to almost 25% in 2005. Id. Meanwhile, private
mortgages with interest-only payment options rose from about 1% in 2001 to 35% in 2004. Id. See
also Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549 (2009).
2. U.S. Department of Treasury, Making Home Affordable, at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/borrower-qa.pdf, at 1; U.S. Department of Treasury,
Making Home Affordable: Updated Detailed Program Description,
http:/ / www.treas.gov/ press/releases/reports/housingfactsheet.pdf.
3. U.S. Department of Treasury, Making Home Affordable,
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/borrowerqa.pdf.
4. As the U.S. government bailed out banks, insurance companies, and the auto industry, it
imposed tough terms on companies. For example, executive pay was capped at banks that were
bailed out by the U.S. See Heidi N. Moore, Citigroup: The Struggle to Keep Phibro Happy, WALL ST. J.
(April 29, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/04/29/citigroup-the-struggle-to-keep-phibro-
happy/. The United States forced out the CEO at General Motors as it spelled out tough terms to
139
Journal of Legislation
billion to "middle class" 5 homeowners - a term used by the U.S. Treasury -
requires nothing more than meeting eligibility requirements.
Government bailouts create moral hazard. 6 This problem occurs when an
insurance program encourages individuals to take fewer precautions against
the insured risk.7 In this case, moral hazard arises when the Treasury
Department's debt relief programs act as insurance against foreclosures.
8
While there are good reasons to relieve home borrower debt, this
government handout raises questions. By benefiting property owners, it favors
the more affluent. Low income renters, in contrast, receive no hardship subsidy
to pay for their housing. Similarly, welfare programs are now recast as
workfare.9 Aid recipients must work or perform public service to receive
benefits.'
0
With this in mind, I ask whether the U.S. can require home loan borrowers
to perform community service in exchange for debt relief. My study draws
loosely from Depression-era programs such as the Civilian Conservation
Corps'1 and Works Project Administration,12 under which the U.S. engaged
destitute citizens in public service projects. But my inquiry relates to a deeper
historical relationship between debt relief and labor. Jewish law decreed
unconditional debt forgiveness in sabbatical years.13 By contrast, Rome
executed debtors and dismembered them for pro-rata distribution to
creditors.14 Henry VIII steered England on a middle path by imprisoning
debtors.
1 5
The criminalization of debt delinquency influenced the American colonies.
The English practice of imprisonment for debt evolved in the U.S. to allow debt
reorganize the company. See Neil King, Jr. & John D. Stoll, Government Forces Out Wagoner at GM,
WALL ST. J. March 30, 2009, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123836090755767077.html. An example of government requiring
poor people to work in order to qualify for public aid appears in Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344
N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. Sup. 1973). See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
5. U.S. Department of Treasury, Fact Sheet: Financial Stability Plan,
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact-sheet.pdf, at 6.
6. Infra note 218.
7. Infra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
8. See source cited infra note 219.
9. Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340,343 (1994).
10. See Ballentine, N.Y.S.2d at 44-45.
11. See generally John Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps and the Negro, 52 J. AM. HIST. 75
(1965).
12. See generally, Michael R. Darby, Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Mislaid:
Or, An Explanation of Unemployment, 1934-1941,84 J. POL.EcON. 1 (1976).
13. See David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis of Insolvency Laws and
Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of Today's United States Bankruptcy Court and its Judicial
Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 165, 166 (2000) (quoting Deuteronomy 15:1-4: "At the end of every
seven years thou shalt make a release. And this is the manner of the release: Every creditor that
lendeth aught unto his neighbor shall release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbor or his brother;
because it is called the Lord's release.").
14. Ven Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor - and a Modest Proposal to Return to
the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 810 (1983).
15. Robert J. Landry, III & Nancy Hisey Mardis, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Debtors' Prison
without Bars or "Just Desserts"for Deadbeats?, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 91, 118 (2006).
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bondage, known as indentured servitude. Masters recruited impoverished
Europeans and Englishmen to bind themselves for five years of labor in
exchange for passage money and subsistence.16 An involuntary system also
arose in which English convicts were shipped to America under indenture.
In time, American idealism tempered these coercive practices. The
Ordinance of 1787 prohibited involuntary servitude in the Northwest
Territory.17 Influenced by this noble charter, an antebellum court nullified a
servitude contract that bound a woman of color to a white man.18 Lincoln's
Emancipation Proclamation declared an end to slavery, and laid the foundation
for the Thirteenth Amendment. 19
This history bears on the five groups of Americans in my study who have
been subjected to compulsory public service. The first group performed road
duty, a practice traceable to 1801.20 Able-bodied men were required by state
and county governments to work several days each year building roads and
bridges, without pay, or face fines and imprisonment. In another practice,
dating to the 1600s, lawyers were ordered to represent indigent defendants
without pay.21 Beginning in the 1940s, draft laws allowed conscientious
objectors to avoid combat. 22 These men were required, however, to accept full-
time jobs in charitable organizations. The 1970s brought two new forms of
public service. Some welfare programs required aid recipients to accept
assignment in community projects if they could not find employment.
23
Separately, the U.S. sought to improve health care in underserved areas by
paying tuition to train doctors. 24 In return, physicians were required to accept a
job assigned by a federal agency.
In all five work scenarios, federal and state government used coercive
sanctions to force recalcitrant individuals to work. Often this meant
16. Countryman, supra note 14, at 812.
17. Phoebe v. Jay, 1 Ill. (Breese) 268, 269 (1828) (quoting the Ordinance of 1807 "There shall be
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.").
18. In a bold decision that pre-dates the Emancipation Proclamation, an Indiana court refused
to hold a "Woman of Color" to a contract that provided for indentured service, stating: "Deplorable
indeed would be the state of society, if the obligee in every contract had a right to seize the person
of the obligor, and force him to comply with his undertaking." The Case of Mary Clark, A Woman
of Colour, 1 Blackf. 122,125-26 (Ind. 1812), available at 1821 WL 974 (Ind.).
19. Compare Abraham Lincoln, Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Nat'l ARCHIVES AND
RECS. ADMIN., Sept. 22, 1862,
http:/ /www.archives.gov/exhibits/american-Originals-iv/sections/preliminary-emancipatiorn-pr
oclamation.html# (stating "[t]hat on the first day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, ... the people whereof
shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free...
."); and U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (stating "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
20. Infra source cited note 49.
21. See infra source cited note 66
22. Selective Training and Service Act, infra note 108.
23. See Ballentine, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
24. Infra notes 141-42.
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imprisonment or fines.25 For doctors, the U.S. trebled their debt.26 Public aid
recipients were threatened with benefits termination.
27
My statistical analysis of 441 court rulings from 1807-2002 joins a growing
research literature on moral hazard related to the mortgage crisis.28 In
particular, I study constitutional theories for resisting compulsory work. The
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits involuntary servitude.29 A related federal law
prohibits peonage, a form of servitude in which a person is coerced to work off
a debt.30 My study suggests that these laws would not impede a federal policy
that requires homeowners to perform community service in return for debt
relief. I propose that individuals perform 200 hours of service in programs such
as Habitat for Humanity.
B. Organization of the Article
In Part II, I examine government imposed work scenarios for five groups of
citizens.31 Road duty, in Part II.A, derived from a Roman law doctrine, trinoda
necessitas.32 Part II.B explores the evolution of pro bono publico, a duty imposed
by judges on lawyers to serve the poor.33 The next section explains how
military draft laws allowed conscientious objectors to avoid combat by working
full-time in charitable jobs.34 Part II.D describes how welfare requires aid
recipients to work or perform community service,35 and Part II.E reports on a
federal program that funds tuition for doctors if they agree to accept
assignment in a poor and underserved area.
36
Part III reports my research methods and findings.37 The first section
describes my empirical methodology, 38 while Part III.B reports my statistical
findings for federal and state courts.39 My data tables summarize trial and
appellate rulings. Breaking the sample into five citizen groups, Tables 1A and
1B quantify the percentage of cases won by the government and the
25. Infra note 126.
26. Infra note 146.
27. Ballentine, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 42,45.
28. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is
Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189 (2009); Rachel D. Godsil, Protecting Status: The Mortgage
Crisis, Eminent Doman, and the Ethic of Home Ownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949 (2008); Rachel
Carlton, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 601 (2008).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1..
30. After recent amendments, 18 U.S.C. § 1584 now provides: "Whoever knowingly and
willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any
other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined."
31. See infra notes 48-156.
32. See infra notes 48-65.
33. See infra notes 66-99.
34. See infra notes 100-26.
35. See infra notes 127-40.
36. See infra notes 141-56.
37. See infra notes 157-87.
38. See infra notes 157-60.
39. See infra note 161.
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individual.40 Tables 2A and 2B break down the main legal issues and quantify
government and individual success rates.41 Tables 3A and 3B summarize the
type of government compulsion-for example, required employment versus
unpaid service- and report on government and individual win rates.42 Part
III.C presents cases that add qualitative context and legal analysis.
43
Part IV.A describes loose lending practices that caused the mortgage
crisis,44 while Part IV.B explains that the Treasury Department's mortgage relief
programs create a new moral hazard.45 Part IV.C explains that a community
service requirement is a feasible condition for receiving mortgage relief.46 My
conclusions appear in Part V.
4 7
II. WORK SCENARIOS FOR MANDATORY SERVICE
A. Road Duty and Trinoda Necessitas
Road duty originated under a Roman law doctrine called trinoda necessitas.
All free men were required to participate in "expedition against the enemy, the
construction of arsenals, and the repairing of bridges."48 In American law,
trinoda necessitas meant road duty -conscription of male adults to build and
maintain roads.
49
Many states required this annual service. 50 Though not a tax, this duty was
similar to unpaid jury or military service. 51 Courts rejected arguments that road
duty was involuntary servitude.52 Violators were fined
53 or jailed.54
40. See infra Part Il. B.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra notes 161-87.
44. See infra notes 192-204.
45. See infra notes 205-24.
46. See infra notes 225-30.
47. See infra notes 23141.
48. Harper v. Brooksher, 240 S.W. 729, 731 (Ark. 1922).
49. See Overseers of the Poor of Amenia v. The Overseers of Stanford, 6 Johns. 92, 92 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1810) (per curiam) (reporting on the Act of 1809, the court treated the assessment and
performance of highway labor as a duty rather than a tax).
50. See, Whitt v. City of Gadsen, 49 So. 682, 682 (Ala. 1909); Taylor v. State, 41 So. 776, 776 (Ala.
1906); Ward v. State, 7 So. 298, 298 (Ala. 1890); Lowery v. State, 12 S.W. 563, 563 (Ark. 1889);
Johnston v. City of Macon, 62 Ga. 645, 648 (1879); Town of Highland v. Suppiger, 103 Ill. 434, 435
(1882); Sawyer v. Alton, 4 11. (3 Scam.) 127, 127 (1841); State ex rel. Dunkelberg v. Porter, 32 N.E.
1021, 1021 (Ind. 1893); In re Dassler, 12 P. 130,133 (Kan. 1886); Barrow v. Hepler, 34 La.Ann. 362,362
(1882); Burlington & Missouri R.R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 4 Neb. 293, 301 (1876); Pickering v.
Pickering, 11 N.H. 141, 143 (1840); Walker v. Moseley, 5 Denio 102, 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847); Bank of
Ithaca v. King, 12 Wend. 390, 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); State v. Wheeler, 53 S.E. 358, 358 (N.C. 1906);
State v. Sharp, 34 S.E. 264, 264 (N.C. 1899); State v. Johnston, 23 S.E. 921, 921 (N.C. 1896); State v.
Halifax, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 345, 348 (1883); Miller v. Gorman, 38 Pa. 309, 311 (1861); Ex parte Roberts,
11 S.W. 782, 782 (Tex. App. 1889); Town of Starksborough v. Town of Hinesboro, 13 Vt. 215, 220
(1841); Biss v. Town of New Haven, 42 Wis. 605, 607 (1877).
51. E.g., Probst v. Calhoun County Court, 106 S.E. 878,880 (W.Va. 1921).
52. E.g., Dennis v. Simon, 36 N.E. 832, 833 (Ohio 1894) (per curiam).
53. E.g., Bouton v. Neilson, 3 Johns. 474,476 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
54. E.g., State v. Hathcock, 20 S.C. 419, 422 (S.C. 1884) (state law provided for ten day
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The duty was controversial because it was imposed unequally. Town
dwellers were exempt from work outside city limits,55 but rural residents had
county-wide duties.56 The latter furnished wagons and teams, plus feed. Courts
acknowledged the disparities but viewed them as legal. 57 The law tolerated
other inequalities. Slaves worked for their owners.58 Road laws exempted men
who performed public duties such as fire fighting.
59
In the early 1900s, states responded to growing criticism by enacting road
taxes.60 But road duty did not end before the Supreme Court affirmed the
practice in a far-reaching decision. Butler v. Perry upheld a Florida law that
required men to work without pay for six days every year on roads and
bridges.61 J.W. Butler was jailed for thirty days after he ignored this duty.
6 2
Upholding the conviction, Butler traced road duty to Roman law.63 The Court
noted that several states, once a part of the Northwest Territory, adopted the
Territory's prohibition against involuntary servitude while also enacting road
duty laws. Butler therefore concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment, which
derived from the Northwest Territory's ban on servitude, did not intend to
extinguish this duty.64 Butler is a vital precedent even though road duty was
abolished long ago. Courts cite it to uphold community service mandates that
are graduation requirements for high school students.
65
imprisonment for ignoring road duty).
55. E.g., DeTavernier v. Hunt, 53 Tenn. (6 Heisk) 599, 599 (1871). A county road assessor took
action against Jacksboro residents to compel their service on county roads. The court dismissed the
action, reasoning: "It follows that the County Court has no authority to assign the inhabitants of
Jacksboro to work on the public roads outside of the town." Id.
56. E.g., State v. Wheeler, 53 S.E. 358, 360 (N.C. 1906), A county resident subject to road duty
four days every year complained that city dwellers were exempted from this requirement. The
court, in rejecting this contention, concluded: "Whenever, in the judgment of the people of Wake
County, the four days' labor per annum still exacted should be reduced, or entirely abolished, they
can send representatives to the General Assembly, who can doubtless procure such changes as the
people may wish in the manner of working their public roads." Id.
57. E.g., State v. Holloman, 52 S.E. 408, 409 (N.C. 1905) ("The old system of working the roads
by conscription of labor was exceedingly inequitable, because it threw the cost of road maintenance
upon those deriving the least benefit therefrom, the laboring element.").
58. See Woolard v. McCullough, 23 N.C. (1 Ired) 432,432 (1841).
59. See Leedy v. Town of Bourbon, 40 N.E. 640, 640 (Ind. 1895).
60. See Holloman, 52 S.E. at 409, ("The change to working the roads by taxation has been
complete in most civilized countries, but has been slower in this state than in most.").
61. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
62. Id. at 330.
63. See id. at 331 (explaining that the duty applied "[w]ith respect to the construction and
repairing of ways and bridges [and] no class of men of whatever rank or dignity should be
exempted from conscription," quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 357).
64. Compare id. (recalling that the ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest
Territory declared: "'There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory,
otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.'") and
U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.").
65. See infra note 240.
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B. Lawyers and Pro Bono Publico
In the 1600s, English courts ordered lawyers to represent criminal
defendants.66 Early American colonial courts adopted the practice, 67 though a
few appellate courts overruled this duty.68 Typical of these early courts, the
Illinois Supreme Court declared: "The law confers on licensed attorneys rights
and privileges, and with them imposes duties and obligations, which must be
reciprocally enjoyed and performed." 69 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
California acknowledged that lawyers "are not considered at liberty to reject,
under circumstances of this character, the cause of the defenseless." 70 Nabb v.
United States extended appointment of unpaid counsel to a Kickapoo Indian
who was charged with manslaughter.
71
This involuntary duty continued after passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment.72 However, some eighteenth century courts presaged a more
contemporary approach of ordering payment to appointed counsel. The
Indiana Supreme Court said that lawyers should be treated like members of
any other profession: "The idea of one calling enjoying peculiar privileges.., is
not congenial to our institutions. And that any class should be paid for their
particular services in empty honors is an obsolete idea belonging to another age
and to a state of society hostile to liberty." 73 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court
reasoned: "It is not presumable that this humane provision of the law for the
protection of the accused, but innocent, poor citizen, was intended by the
legislature to be at the expense.., of the citizen, whose profession is that of an
attorney."
74
Nonetheless, pro bono publico remained vital in the twentieth century. Judge
Cardozo's scholarly decision set the tone for expanding the duty during the
New Deal and the civil rights movement. 75 However, several Supreme Court
rulings that required states to provide counsel to the poor loosened pro bono
66. See Case 501. __ v. Sir William Scroggs and J.S., 3 Keb. 424, 89 Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B. 1674)
(stating that "if the Court should assign him to be counsel, he ought to attend; and if he refuse, per
Hale, C.J. we would not hear him, nay, we would make bold to commit him....").
67. See e.g., Whicher v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 1 Greene 217, 218 (Iowa 1848); Hall v. Washington
County, 2 Greene 473, 473 (Iowa 1850); Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 14 (1854); and Carpenter v. Dane
County, 9 Wis. 249, 250 (1859).
68. See Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525, 525 (1853) (Overturning a contempt ruling for refusing to
represent an indigent defendant because compulsory appointment violated the state constitution.).
69. Vise v. Hamilton County, 19 Ill. 78, 79 (1857).
70. Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61, 62 (1860).
71. See 1 Ct. Cl. 173, 173 (1864).
72. See, e.g., Posey & Tompkins v. Mobile County, 50 Ala. 6, 6 (1873); Arkansas County v.
Freeman & Johnson, 31 Ark. 266 (1876); Lamont v. Solano County, 49 Cal. 158, 158 (1874); Elam v.
Johnson, 48 Ga. 348,348 (1873); Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 Ill. 22, 22 (1884) Johnston v. Lewis
and Clarke County, 2 Mont. 159, 159 (1874); Washoe County v. Humboldt County, 14 Nev. 123, 123
(1879); Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99, 99 (1879); House v. Whitis, 64 Tenn. 690,690 (1875).
73. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16 (1854).
74. Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473, 478-79 (Iowa 1850),
75. See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (stating: "Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The appellant was received into that ancient
fellowship for something more than private gain.")
2010]
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publico's grip.76 In response to more appointments that resulted from these
precedents, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 to provide
limited pay.
77
As more attorneys represented indigent clients, they raised constitutional
objections. 78 But courts dismissed Thirteenth Amendment challenges to
compulsory appointments. 79 Williamson v. Vardeman said that the "Thirteenth
Amendment has never been applied to forbid compulsion of traditional modes
of public service even when only a limited segment of the population is so
compelled." 80 Courts also ruled that unpaid appointments do not deprive
lawyers of their property, 81 nor deny equal protection.
82
While the clear weight of authority favors appointment of counsel, pro bono
publico is not an endless duty. In the nineteenth century, some states softened it
by enacting statutes that provided courts discretion to assign or request
attorneys to serve without compensation. 83 Hall v. Washington County justified
76. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 355 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 353
(1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 25 (1972).
77. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as amended 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (1976)), responded to the increased number of compulsory appointments that
resulted from Gideon and similar rulings. The law's provision for limited fee awards is discussed in
U.S. v. Johnson, 549 F. Supp. 78,80 (D.D.C. 1982).
78. See Contempt of Spann, 443 A.2d 239, 240 (N.J. 1982) (sentencing an attorney to a suspended
sentence of six months in jail for failing to obey an order to represent an indigent client, and fining
him $1,000).
79. See Williamson v. Vardeman, 647 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding that attorneys
may be compelled to represent indigent defendants without compensation, noting that the
"thirteenth amendment has never been applied to forbid compulsion of traditional modes of public
service even when only a limited segment of the population is so compelled.") See also State ex rel.
Dressler v. Circuit Court for Racine County, 472 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Wis. 1991). For an interesting
court opinion, see Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Ct., 742 F.2d 515, 517 (9th Cir. 1984), where
attorneys suggested that their court appointments were a form of involuntary servitude. Struck by
the reluctance of lawyers to aid Bradshaw, the court reflected: "When the degree of resistance is so
high that attorneys would rather confront the court with questionable thirteenth amendment
arguments than provide counsel for an indigent, the helpfulness of coercive appointment is subject
to question." Id.
80. 673 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982).
81. See State v. Doucet, 352 So.2d 222, 223 (La. 1977) ( "Defense counsel's argument that an
appointment without compensation violates the lawyer's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments has consistently been rejected ... on grounds that there is no 'taking' where the
lawyer performs a duty required of him in his exercise of the privilege of membership in the bar.").
82. See New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. D.C., 571 A.2d 1295, 1301 (N.J. 1990)
(illustrating the equal protection argument). Attorneys argued that failure to pay lawyers for
compulsory representation violated equal protection by treating attorneys differently from other
licensed professionals. The court dismissed this reasoning, stating that the "distinctions between
attorneys and other professionals
... need be only rationally related to a legitimate state objective." Id. But some courts have been
sensitive to the disparity of compulsory service among licensed professionals. While Madden v.
Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 211 (N.J. 1992) rejected an equal protection challenge, it
expressed concern about growing disparities in assigning counsel to cases, and modified New
Jersey's service requirement. In dictum, State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1156-57 (Ok. 1990), observed:
A lawyer's skills and services are his/her only means of livelihood. The taking thereof, without
adequate compensation, is analogous to taking the goods of merchants or requiring free services
of architects, engineers, accountants, physicians, nurses or of one of the thirty-four other
occupations or professions in this state which require a person to be licensed before practicing
the occupation or profession.
83. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 302-03 (1989) (citing state laws for appointing
2010] The Inequality of Sacrifice
its refusal to order unpaid representation by emphasizing that a lawyer's "time,
labor and professional skill are his own. He should not be required to bestow
them gratuitously at the will of the court, any more than should any other
officer." 84 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Carpenter v. County of Dane,
85
reasoned that lawyers cannot always choose their client and must be ready to
summon their talents for people who may have committed despicable acts.
86
However, the court asked, "But is it just to impose upon them the burden of
laborious and gratuitous services, or the alternative of witnessing all principles
of law and justice outraged in the conviction of an undefended prisoner?"
8 7
The U.S. Supreme Court also placed limits on pro bono publico. Ruling that a
mother was not entitled to appointed counsel in an action to terminate her
parental rights, Justice White stated that "as a litigant's interest in personal
liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel." 88 More recently, the
Supreme Court ruled in Mallard v. U.S. District Court for Southern District of Iowa
that federal law does not require appointed attorneys to represent inmates who
sue prison officials.89 After Mallard, some courts denied motions for appointed
counsel. 9 0
counsel).
84. 2 Greene 473, 476 (Iowa 1850).
85. 9 Wis. 249, 252 (1859).
86. See id. ( "It is the boast of the profession that its members have ever been ready to volunteer
their services in behalf of the unfortunate, despised, degraded criminal, so that he should have a
fair trial.").
87. Id. (concluding "It seems eminently proper and just that the county . . . should pay an
attorney for defending a destitute criminal.").
88. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981).
89. 490 U.S. 296 (1989). An inexperienced attorney who was assigned a case involving complex
litigation sought reappointment to a case that would pose more familiar legal issues. Id. The federal
statute authorizing appointment of counsel said that the court may request an attorney to provide
representation. Id. Giving weight to this permissive clause, Mallard ruled that the Iowa federal
district court did not have authority to compel the attorney to represent the inmate. The court
declared:
We emphasize that our decision today is limited to interpreting § 1915(d). We
do not mean to question, let alone denigrate, lawyers' ethical obligation to
assist those who are too poor to afford counsel, or to suggest that requests
made pursuant to § 1915(d) may be lightly declined because they give rise to no
ethical claim. On the contrary, in a time when the need for legal services among
the poor is growing and public funding for such services has not kept pace,
lawyers' ethical obligation to volunteer their time and skills pro bono publico is
manifest. Nor do we express an opinion on the question whether the federal
courts possess inherent authority to require lawyers to serve.
Id. at 310.
90. See e.g., Colbert v. Rickmon, 747 F.Supp. 518, 519 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (holding that the court
lacked statutory and discretionary authority to order unwilling attorney to help prisoner prosecute
a civil rights claim); Spencer v. Williams, 2005 WL 2671345 at *1 (W.D.Va. Oct. 19, 2005) (dismissing
prisoner's § 1983 claim that he was denied proper medical care for his diabetes). For an example of
a court that interpreted the federal counsel law as providing discretion to make such appointments
in civil cases, see Reid v. Charney, 235 F.2d 47, 47 (6th Cir. 1956) ("In contrast to criminal
proceeding, in which the court has a duty to 'assign' counsel to represent a defendant in accordance
with his Constitutional right, .. . the court in a civil case has the statutory power only to 'request an
attorney to represent' a person unable to employ counsel.".
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Nonetheless, pro bon publico has been extended beyond criminal defense to
a wide range of civil actions, including involuntary transfer of elderly patients
from a hospital to a nursing home, 91 marital dissolutions, 92 terminations of
parental rights,93 adoptions,94 paternity disputes,95 contested deeds,96 civil
contempt, 97  evictions,98  and prisoner exposure to cruel and unusual
punishment.9 9
C. Conscientious Objectors and Compulsory Work
The Constitution provides Congress far-reaching authority to call up a
militia.100 The War of 1812 provided the first occasion to propose a draft, but
the idea was not implemented. 1 1 President Lincoln acted on the idea by calling
up males between the ages of twenty and forty-five.10 2 During World War I,
Congress authorized another draft.10 3 The law required all men between the
ages of twenty-one and thirty to register and present themselves for service.
10 4
However, it also exempted members of religious groups who objected on moral
grounds.10 5 Sustaining congressional power to enact this legislation, Arver v.
United States rejected a Thirteenth Amendment argument against a war-time
draft.
106
More recently, Congress created an exempt classification for conscientious
objectors.10 7 This law required objectors to contribute "to the maintenance of
the national health, safety, or interest" 10 8 by performing civilian work in lieu of
91. E.g., Application of St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 607 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993).
92. E.g. Smiley v. Smiley, 356 N.Y.S.2d 733, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); Jacox v. Jacox, 350
N.Y.S.2d 435.436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); Bartlett v. Kitchin, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (N.Y. Sup. 1973);
and Emerson v. Emerson, 308 N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 (N.Y App. Div. 1970).
93. E.g., In re Ella B., 285 N.E.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. 1972); In re Luscier's Welfare, 524 P.2d 906, 907
(Wash. 1974); State ex rel. v. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140, 141 (W. Va. 1974); V.F. v. State, 666
P.2d 42, 43-44 (Alaska 1983); Ex rel. D.B., 385 So.2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980).
94. E.g., In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601, 601 (Pa. 1973).
95. E.g., Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 228 (Cal. 1979).
96. E.g., In re Goreson v. Gallagher, 485 N.Y.S.2d 664,665 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
97. E.g., Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 537-38 (Alaska 1974); In re Williams v. Williams, 458
N.Y.S.2d. 641,642 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
98. E.g., Hotel Martha Washington Mgmt. Co. v. Swinick, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (N.Y. App. Term
1971).
99. E.g., Lofton v. Delassandri, 3 Fed.App'x. 658, 661 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that the prison
officials failed to isolate prisoners who tested positive for tuberculosis from other inmates).
100. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (providing Congress authority to call forth the militia to execute
the laws of the nation to suppress insurrections and repel invasions).
101. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 384-85 (1918).
102. Universal Military Training and Service Act, Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
103. Act of May 18,1917, Pub. L. 65-12, ch. 15,40 Stat. 76 (1917).
104. Id.
105. Universal Military Training and Service Act, supra note 102.
106. 245 U.S. at 380.
107. Universal Military Training and Service Act, supra note 102.
108. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885 (1940) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 301-309(a) (2000). A detailed excerpt of regulations under the law
appears in Kramer v. United States, 147 F.2d 756, 761 (6th Cir. 1945).
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military service. These assignments lasted twenty-four months,10 9 and were
structured as employment.110
Conscientious objectors worked harder and for less pay compared to their
civilian jobs.111 During World War II, they labored in rural camps,112 sometimes
six days per week.113 Hard physical work was replaced after World War II by
urban assignments with social service agencies. 114 Often, objectors worked for
hospitals or charities.
115
Courts did not view compulsory civilian work as involuntary servitude
11 6
or as a taking of property without just compensation. 117 A military emergency
was not needed to justify the government's requirement for duty.118 While
many objectors held religious titles, they did not qualify for a ministerial
exemption from mandatory duty.119
Judges were also unmoved when conscientious objectors claimed that their
work conditions were harsh. United States v. Emery concluded that the selective
service system, with its "requirements of forced military service for selectees in
general and of the substituted work of national importance for conscientious
objectors, would not be operable if claimed harshnesses in detail could be
contested by refusing any obedience to the system." 120 Nor did courts equate
109. United States v. Gidmark, 440 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1971).
110. See United States v. Crouch, 415 F.2d 425, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1969) (reciting 32 CFR §1660.1"(a)
The types of employment which may be considered . . . to be civilian work contributing to the
maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest ... shall be limited to the following:
. . . (2) Employment by a nonprofit organization, association, or corporation which is primarily
engaged either in a charitable activity for the benefit of the general public or in carrying out a
program for the improvement of the public health or welfare.. ").
111. Frank v. United States, 236 F.2d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1956).
112. E.g., Kramer v. United States, 147 F.2d 756, 757 (6th Cir. 1945) (reporting assignment to
Camp No. 23 in Carroll County, Ohio); Brooks v. United States, 147 F.2d 134, 134 (2d Cir. 1945)
(reporting assignment to Civilian Public Service Camp No. 111 in Mancos, Colorado).
113. E.g., United States v. Emery, 168 F.2d 454, 455 (2d Cir. 1948) (noting that the conscientious
objector was compelled to work on a dairy herd from 4:30 a.m. until 5:30 p.m.).
114. E.g., United States v. Sutter, 127 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
115. E.g., United States v. Harris, 446 F.2d 129, 130 (7th Cir. 1971) (assignment to state hospital);
Badger v. United States, 322 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1963) (assignment to county department of
charities).
116. E.g., Howze v. United States, 272 F.2d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1959) ("Compulsory civilian labor..
is not a punishment, but is instead a means for preserving discipline and morale in the armed
forces.").
117. E.g., United States v. Hobbs, 450 F.2d 935, 937 (10th Cir. 1971) (rejecting claim that the
Military Service Act of 1967 constitutes involuntary servitude and taking of property without just
compensation).
118. E.g., O'Connor v. United States, 415 F.2d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 1969) (rejecting claim that
alternative civilian service is unconstitutional).
119. E.g., United States v. Smith, 124 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. 111. 1954) (newly ordained Jehovah's
Witness minister was not granted ministerial exemption); United States v. Niles, 122 F. Supp. 383
(N.D.Cal. 1954) (ruling that the Thirteenth Amendment does not limit the war powers of
government); Atherton v. United States, 176 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1949) ("[A] requirement to perfom
work of national importance in lieu of induction into military service can not be said to controvert
the Thirteenth Amendment.); United States v. Thorn, 317 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.La. 1970) (ruling that the
Selective Service Act does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment); United States v. Von Nieda, 134
F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (Jehovah's Witness member was not granted ministerial exemption).
120. 168 F.2d 454, 457 (2d Cir. 1948).
2010]
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 36:139
forced civilian duty with convict labor.' 21
Courts took a broad view of work that constituted the national interest. The
conscientious objector in United States v. Copeland failed to convince a judge that
assignment to Goodwill Industries did not fulfill a public purpose. On rare
occasion, however, objectors avoided civilian duty and escaped criminal
sanctions 122 United States v. Casias overturned a conviction because the
government failed to provide an objector his Miranda rights when it sought
incriminating information from him.12 3 The Seventh Circuit overturned a five
year sentence in Huisinga v. United States after the trial judge and draft board
ignored information that the objector qualified for a full ministerial
exemption.
124
But court reversals of draft board decisions were rare. The Supreme Court,
in Cox v. United States, explained that Congress denied judges "the customary
scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the
courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification
made by the local boards was justified."125 Thus, objectors who failed to
complete civilian assignments were jailed up to five years. 126
D. Public Assistance and Workfare
In the 1820s, indigents could be declared by law as paupers and required to
work for the public as a condition for support.127 A pauper's work in a
poorhouse paid his debt for support.128 Similarly, during the Depression a relief
worker's civic service paid his debt to a city.129 In the same period, public
service employees were unable to block a work relief program that created
labor market competition.
130
121. See Brooks v. United States, 54 F.Supp. 995, 996 (D.C.N.Y. 1944) (alluding to the isolated
conditions of the "labor camp" and the fact that the conscientious objector was not convicted of a
crime).
122. 126 F. Supp. 734, 736 (D. Conn. 1954).
123. 306 F. Supp. 166,166 (D. Colo. 1969).
124. 422 F.2d 635, 635 (7th Cir. 1970).
125. 332 U.S. 442,448 (1947).
126. United States v. Chaudron, 425 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir. 1970) (individual sentenced to five years
in prison).
127. See Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Cambridge, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 267, 267 (1838). The state
lost its lawsuit against a city to recover for alleged overpayments to paupers from 1828 through
1836. Id. at 269.
128. See City of Taunton v. Talbot, 71 N.E. 785, 785 (Mass. 1904). The court concluded that the
"defendant has been a valuable hand at the almshouse, being steady and industrious, having
charge of the barn, with general oversight of the horses, cows, etc., for which duties he had peculiar
aptitude, and has performed services fully commensurate with the amount sought to be recovered
by the city." Id. at 786.
129. See City of Marlborough v. City of Lowell, 10 N.E.2d 104, 105 (Mass. 1937). The city argued
that because the purpose of work was to rehabilitate the recipient, the city should receive full
reimbursement of its cash assistance. The court rejected this theory. Id.
130. See Soc Investigator Eligibles Ass'n v. Taylor, 197 N.E 262, 264 (N.Y. 1935), dismissing a wage-
law challenge: "These persons are among those selected by a unit of the Temporary Emergency
Relief Administration for the bounty of work needed to sustain life. At the request of that body
their services have been used in conformity with the statutory machinery devised for warfare with
unemployment." Id.
The Inequality of Sacifice
Workfare came back into vogue in the 1970s, when some states enacted
laws that required aid recipients to perform public services. 131 New York, for
example, withheld benefits unless an individual registered with the job services
office.132 The requirement to register for work in order to receive public aid did
not constitute involuntary servitude or peonage. 133 Failure to report to work
resulted in aid termination.
134
Today, recipients are not entitled to the same pay as public employees, nor
are they owed a minimum wage.135 The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 allows states to require aid recipients to
work in order to qualify for benefits.
136
As a condition for providing aid to a needy family, a state may order a
131. E.g., Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39,41-42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), provides a detailed
illustration of how a public aid law conditions public aid upon a recipient's performance of public
duties. Employable persons who receive public aid "shall be required to perform such work as shall
be assigned to them by the social services official furnishing such home relief." Id. at 41. The law
authorized a social services agency to establish "public work projects for the assignment of
employable persons in receipt of home relief to perform work for such county, city or town or for
the state, and the head of any department." Id. at 42. Agency officials were also authorized to
"assign such persons in receipt of home relief who, in his judgment, are able to perform the work
indicated." Id. Also, the law also provided a detailed work schedule formula. Id. Finally, the law
also authorized termination of benefits for anyone who refused "to report for or to perform work to
which he has been assigned." Id.
132. See N.Y. Dep't of State Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 407 (1973), where the issue was
whether the Social Security Act of 1935 barred a state from independently requiring individuals to
accept employment as a condition for receipt of federally-funded aid to families with dependent
children.
133. Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990). After Brogan suffered a
disabling heart attack at sixty-one years of age, he alleged that his medical condition was caused by
poor working conditions in the workfare program and asked for $250,000 in damages. Id. at 763. He
also challenged his mandatory participation in San Mateo County's Vocational Rehabilitation
Program, required as a condition for receiving public assistance. Id. Rejecting Brogan's argument
that the workfare program violated the Thirteenth Amendment and peonage laws, the Ninth
Circuit concluded:
State work programs are one valid way of encouraging the recipients of public
assistance to return to gainful employment (citations omitted). They do not
constitute involuntary servitude or peonage in violation of the thirteenth
amendment, which occurs when an individual coerces another into his service by
improper or wrongful conduct that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other
person to believe that he or she has no alternative but to perform the labor.
Id. at 764.
134. See Delgado v. Milwaukee County, 611 F. Supp. 278, 280 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (ruling that the
aid recipient did not state a claim for relief under the anti-peonage law. The court observed that
"[s]ince 1945the state has permitted counties to condition the receipt of general assistance benefits
on participation in a work relief program.").
the state has permitted counties to condition the receipt of general assistance benefits on
participation in a work relief program.")
135. See Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1548, 1559 (10th Cir. 1995) Recipients were required to
perform thirty-two hours per week of community work, adult education, and skills training
activities, and eight hours per week of job search activities. Id. at 1549. See also Brukham v. Guiliani,
705 N.E.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. 2000) (ruling that the wage law did not apply to this relief program).
136. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2113 (1996), which in turn authorized a new program,
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch.
531, Title IV, § 401).
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neglectful father to perform community service. 137 A trial court may
constitutionally impose a contempt sanction on a parent who refuses to seek
employment in order to pay child support.
138
Courts reject the idea that workfare is peonage.139 Ballentine v. Sugarman
reasoned that however difficult the loss of public aid, "a person is not held in a
state of peonage when the only sanction for his refusing to work is that he will
not receive payments currently. That may be a form of mankind's immemorial
bondage of bread; but it is not peonage."'
40
In short, the current trend requires employment or community service as a
condition for public aid. Recipients who do not comply with these requirements
face termination of benefits. But for some individuals, this amounts to coercion.
E. Mandatory Work Assignments for Physicians
In a program called the National Health Service Corps (NHSC),141 the
United States pays tuition to medical students who agree to work in areas that
are underserved by health care providers. 142 NHSC doctors must work one
year in an assignment for each year of financial support, with a maximum
obligation of four years.
143
137. Commonwealth v. Pouliot, 198 N.E. 256 (Mass. 1935). A man was charged with criminal
failure to provide support for his wife and six minor children. Id. at 256. Unable to find
employment, Pouliot was dependent on public aid for income. Id. The welfare department required
recipients to work as a condition for receiving income, but Pouliot refused to report for duty. Id.
Upholding his conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected Pouliot's Thirteenth
Amendment argument:
Manifestly, it is not slavery or involuntary servitude as thus authoritatively defined
to sentence this defendant if he fails to perform his duty to support his family. The
obligation of a husband and father to maintain his family, if in any way able to do
so, is one of the primary responsibilities established by human nature and by
civilized society .... In a period of depression like the present, it is reasonable to
require one in the position of the defendant to work under the conditions shown in
the case at bar in order to meet his obligation to his family.
Id. at 257.
138. See Moss v. Super. Ct. (Ortiz), 950 P.2d 59, 60 (Cal. 1998). The court explained that
involuntary servitude is "contextual," and in the case of ordering employment to satisfy the duty of
providing child support, a decree does not force labor because the individual "is free to leave, either
in favor of another employer or if the working conditions are objectively intolerable." Id. at 71. The
court also explained: "[The United .States Supreme Court] has never held that employment
undertaken to comply with a judicially imposed requirement that a party seek and accept
employment when necessary to meet a parent's fundamental obligation to support a child is
involuntary servitude." Id. at 66.
139. See Delgado v. Milwaukee County, 611 F. Supp. 278, 280 (E.D. Wis. 1985) ("[An individual]
is under no compulsion to participate in [a state's] general relief program. Moreover, because there
is no threat of penal sanction for failure to abide by the work relief rules, the program does not
constitute peonage.").
140. Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39,45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
141. The program was established by the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970, Pub.L. No.
91-623, 84 Stat. 1868, 1868-69, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 201.
142. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 254d-254e.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 254 f-1 (2006). See Rendleman v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 1537, 1539 (9th Cir. 1988)
(program was designed to "address the maldistribution of health care manpower in the United
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But some recipients renege on undesirable assignments.144 The United
States does not force doctors to work against their will, but sues to recover three
times the outstanding amount on the tuition grant. To illustrate, in United States
v. Bloom the government sued to recover $152,579, plus interest of $345,410.145
Some physicians argue that treble damages are so coercive that the
assignment amounts to involuntary servitude. United States v. Redovan rejected
this reasoning, noting that the doctor's circumstances differed from poor
illiterates who were victims of peonage.146 Courts consistently uphold the treble
damages provision of the law. 147 They reason that the value of lost services "is
difficult if not impossible to determine."1 48 Another provision allows the
government to also collect compensatory damages. United States v. Vanhorn
awarded NHSC $183,953 in damages based on tuition grants that totaled
$26,582.149 Ruling that this amount was not unconscionable, the court noted
that the doctor was told to comply with her service commitment before NHSC
imposed damages.
150
Chapter 7 bankruptcy litigation highlights the hard choice that physicians
face between accepting an assignment and paying dearly for the freedom to
practice medicine elsewhere. In Mathews v. Pineo an internist preferred to work
in Pennsylvania but was assigned to a job in South Dakota. 151 She made no
effort to accept the assignment, and took her preferred job. The NHSC program
won a court repayment order of about $400,000.152 After Dr. Mathews filed for
bankruptcy, the court discharged part of her tuition debt.153 But the Third
Circuit reversed this ruling, finding that she failed to prove that assignment to
South Dakota was shockingly unfair, harsh, or unjust.
154
States").
144. See United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1991) (doctor was assigned to
Texas instead of preferences in California); United States v. Kokayi, 968 F. Supp. 870, 872 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (doctor objected to relocation from Yale University to Alabama); United Sates v. Ledwith, 805
F. Supp. 371, 371 (E.D. Va. 1992) (doctor refused assignment to position with Indian Health
Services).
145. 112 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1997).
146. 656 F. Supp. 121, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1986). The court explained:
All of the cases cited by the defendant involved unfortunate individuals, some of
whom were illiterate and even unable to communicate in English, who were ill
equipped to understand the scope of the obligation they entered into until the die
was cast. Redovan can hardly claim to be in a similar position. He understood the
nature of the obligation before he entered into it as an educated professional.
147. See United Sates v. Bills, 639 F. Supp. 825, 825 (D.N.J. 1986); United States v. Hayes, 633 F.
Supp. 1183, 1184 (M.D.N.C. 1986); United States v. Fowler, 659 F. Supp. 624, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
United States v. Haithco, 644 F. Supp. 63,63 (W.D. Mich. 1986); and United States v. Armstrong, 784
F. Supp. 356,359 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
148. See United States v. Turner, 660 F. Supp. 1323, 1332 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
149. 20 F.3d 104, 113 (4th Cir. 1994).
150. Id.
151. 19 F.3d 121,123 (3d Cir. 1994).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 124. The fact that she would uproot her family from Pennsylvania was unpersuasive.
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Like Mathews, most courts strictly construe unconscionability in the NHSC
regulations.155 Only a few deviate from this trend. 156 Courts view the NHSC
program as voluntary. While medical students are not forced to apply for
tuition help, some find their assignments are so distant or disruptive that they
perceive their job as involuntary work.
III. RESEARCH METHODS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Research Methods
I derived my sample from Westlaw's internet service. Using federal and
state databases, I began by exploring cases that used keywords such as
"involuntary servitude," "Thirteenth Amendment," "compulsory service," and
similar expressions. This helped me to identify nine types of individuals who
challenged mandatory service assignments: high school students, lawyers
performing court ordered representation, military conscripts, witnesses and
jurors who were under subpoena, men who performed road duty, public aid
recipients, physicians who received NHSC tuition grants, and prisoners who
were sentenced to perform labor.
I excluded high school students and prisoners from further analysis
because of the special state powers that apply to their circumstances. As
minors, high school students are subject to a degree of government control that
fundamentally differs from adults. Similar reasoning applies to court ordered
labor for convicts. Their work cannot be considered as employment or service
in the same vein as other forms of compulsory work in my study. I dropped
involuntary servitude claims by witnesses and jurors because their cases were
too rare to compare in a statistical analysis with other groups.
As I became more familiar with cases involving the remaining types of
individuals who challenged compulsory assignments, I expanded my search
techniques. I gained cases by researching statutes such as 18 U.S.C. §
1591(a)(2),157 the law governing the military's selective service, 158 and the
NHSC's tuition payment program.
159
After I identified a potential case, I read it to see if it involved some aspect
of government-ordered service or employment. If it met this criteria, I checked
it against a roster of previously read cases to avoid duplication. Data were
155. See United States v. Kephart, 170 B.R. 787, 792 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying discharge of
NHSC scholarship debt on grounds of unconscionability because "it would be perverse to allow the
debtor to benefit from her own inaction, delay and recalcitrance by automatically granting
discharge simply because the debt is sizeable.")
156. In re Ascue, No. 1:01CV00159, 1:00CV00161, 2002 WL 192561 (W.D. Va. 2002) (affirming
bankruptcy court's discharge of more than $300,000 because doctor had two accidents involving his
neck); In re Owens, 82 B.R. 960 (Bankr. N.D. IlL. 1988) (denying objections to a discharge plan that
allowed repayment of 15% of the debt).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2006).
158. Supra note 108.
159. Supra note 142.
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recorded for each decision. 160 The cases are listed in the Appendix.
B. Statistical Findings
The sample contained 134 federal and 101 state cases. The earliest case was
decided in 1807. The most recent one occurred in 2002. Each of the 235 cases
was adjudicated at a trial, while 194 were decided by an appellate court, and 12
more were ruled on by a supreme court. Thus, the sample of 235 cases yielded
441 judicial rulings on individual challenges to mandatory service or
employment.
My database had serious limitations. Often, cases were cursory opinions
with incomplete information. For example, many lawyer challenges to a pro
bono assignment did not report the legal basis for the action. Other cases did not
have a year for the lower court ruling, and therefore had at least one missing
variable. The cross-tabulations in Table 1A through 3B dropped entire cases
when data was missing on one of the pertinent variables. This explains why the
totals vary for the cases reported in these tables.
Finding 1: In 82.9% of state and federal trials, courts upheld government-
imposed work and service requirements (see Total, Table 1A). The government
enjoyed its greatest success defeating challenges made by conscientious
objectors, winning 95.1% of these cases. In contrast, physicians in the NHSC
program were the most successful challengers to government-ordered work,
winning 34.6% of their cases at trial.
Table 1A
Individual Challenges to Government Imposed Work or Service
Trial Court Rulings
Status of Individual Trial Court Rules Trial Court Rules
for Individual for Government
Conscientious Objector 5 98
Mandatory Employment 4.9% 95.1%
Public Aid Recipient 1 12
Public Service or 7.7% 92.3%
Employment Requirement
Men on Road Duty 17 49
Mandatory Civic Service 25.8% 74.2%
Lawyer 8 18
Pro Bono Publico Appointment 30.8% 69.2%
160. Variables included: (1) state or federal court, (2) year of trial, (3) year of appellate decision, (4)
status of individual who challenged the mandatory duty (e.g., lawyer, conscientious objector, men
assigned to road duty, public aid recipients, and NHSC doctors),(5) federal laws used for legal
challenge, (6) state laws used for legal challenge, (7) type of challenged action (e.g., forced
employment, or forced service), (8) party who won at trial (individual or government), (9) party




Mandatory Work Assignment 34.6% 65.4%
TOTAL (N = 194) 40 194
17.1% 82.9%
Table 1B
Individual Challenges to Government Imposed Work or Service
Appellate Court Rulings
Status of Individual Appellate Court Rules Appellate Court Rules
for Individual for Government
Physician 1 10
Mandatory Work Assignment 9.1% 90.9%
Lawyer 3 20
Pro Bono Publico Appointment 13.0% 87.0%
Conscientious Objector 13 69
Mandatory Employment 15.9% 84.1%
Men on Road Duty 30 35
Mandatory Civic Service 46.2% 53.8%
Public Aid Recipient 6 6
Public Service or Employment 50.0% 50.0%
Requirement
TOTAL (N = 193) 53 140
27.5% 72.5%
Table 2A
Legal Issues to Challenge Government Imposed Work or Service
Trial Court Rulings
Legal Issue Trial Court Rules Trial Court Rules
for Individual for Government
Thirteenth 0 34
Amendment 0% 100%
Equal Protection 0 6
0% 100%
Due Process 0 36
0% 100%
Other Federal Statutes 15 116
11.5% 88.5%
State Constitution 10 18
35.7% 64.3%
Other State Statutes 16 46
25.8% 74.2%
TOTAL (N=297) 41 256
13.8% 86.2%
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Table 2B
Legal Issues to Challenge Government Imposed Work or Service
Appellate Court Rulings
Legal Issue Appellate Court Rules Appellate Court Rules
for Individual for Government
Thirteenth 2 23
Amendment 8.0% 92.0%
Equal Protection 0 5
0% 100%
Due Process 2 27
6.9% 93.1%
Other Federal Statutes 15 80
15.8% 84.2%
State Constitution 7 21
25.0% 75.0%
Other State Statutes 29 32
47.7% 52.5%
TOTAL (N= 243) 55 188
22.6% 77.4%
Table 3A
Government Coercion of Individuals
Trial Court Rulings
Government Action Trial Court Rules Trial Court Rules
for Individual for Government
Imprisonment for Disobeying 0 67
Required Duty 0% 100%
Compulsory Employment 14 118
10.6% 89.4%
Compulsory 17 50
Civic Duty 25.4% 74.6%
Criminal Fine for Disobeying 12 31
Required Duty 27.9% 72.1%
Pay for Performing Required 7 21
Duty 25.0% 75.0%
TOTAL (N = 337) 50 287
14.8% 85.1%
Table 3B
Government Coercion of Individuals
App ellate Court Rulings
Government Action Appellate Court Appellate Court Rules
Rules for Government
for Individual
Compulsory Employment 17 78
2010]
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Finding 2: For the most part, appellate courts followed trial courts in upholding
mandatory work and service, but the government's win rate fell to 72.5% of state and
federal trial rulings (see Total, Table 1B). Federal and state governments were highly
successful in challenges brought by physicians (90.9%), lawyers (87.0%), and
conscientious objectors (84.1%). However, men on road duty (46.2% win-rate) and
public aid recipients (50.0% win-rate) won half of their cases before appellate courts.
Finding 3: Trial courts ruled that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit
government-imposed work and service (see top three rows, Table 2A). In all thirty-four
cases alleging a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the government prevailed.
Every Equal Protection and Due Process challenge failed.
Finding 4: Table 2A shows that individuals were moderately successful when their
trial arguments were based on state constitutions (35.7%). They had less success when
they relied on other state (25.8%) or federal (11.5%) laws. As I explain below, these
were often narrow rulings that the law was not properly applied to circumstances.
Finding 5: Appellate courts in Table 2B rarely ruled that a work or service
obligation violated the United States Constitution. Individuals won only two cases (see
Table 2B, top left cell, 8%). The individual's success rate rose in appellate cases when
they based their challenge on state statutes (compare 47.7% rate in lower-left cell in
Table 2B, and 25.8% rate in lower left cell in Table 2A).
Finding 6: When governments sought to imprison individuals for failing to
perform a public duty such as road duty or employment in lieu of military service, they
prevailed in 100% of these cases (see Table 3A, top right cell). Important to note, fines
were a common alternative to jail in road duty cases. When governments required
conscientious objectors and public aid recipients to seek employment, they won 89.4%
of trials. These courts upheld a compulsory civic duty in 74.6% of cases. When
attorneys sought pay for performing court ordered representation, they won 25.0% of
their cases.
Finding 7: Appellate courts were twice as likely, compared to trial courts, to rule
for individuals who challenged mandatory work or service obligations. Individuals won
29.1% of their cases before appellate courts (see Table 3B, bottom row ), compared to
14.8% of trials (see Table 3A, bottom row).
17.9% 82.1%
Imprisonment for Disobeying 11 50
Required Duty 18.0% 82.0%
Pay for Performing Required 5 19
Duty 20.8% 79.2%
Compulsory 30 36
Civic Duty 45.5% 54.5%
Criminal Fine for Disobeying 21 22
Required Duty 48.8% 51.2%
TOTAL (N = 289) 84 205
29.1% 70.9%
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C. Qualitative Discussion of the Statistical Findings
Tables 1A and 1B (Findings 1 and 2): Overall, trial and appellate courts upheld
government imposed work and service requirements. A century ago, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court said that "in the defense of indigent persons the good lawyer finds his
opportunity to do this kind of labor, and he should do it cheerfully... without
complaining, and remembering that his best reward is the sense of a public duty
faithfully performed.' 161 Modern courts agreed. Utah's highest court set forth an
expansive view of the lawyer's professional responsibility to serve the public without
pay.16 2 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court said that "an assigned attorney...
needs no motivation beyond his sense of duty and his pride."'
163
A similar view of civic duty permeated cases involving conscientious objectors.
Hopper v. United States declared: "Surely it is not expecting too much to require of
them that they do civilian work of national importance at a time when their brothers,
under the same compulsion, are giving their lives for them and for the Nation."
164
Emphasizing related themes, Howze v. United States reasoned that "[c]ompulsory
civilian labor does not stand alone, but it is the alternative to compulsory military
service. It is not a punishment, but is instead a means for preserving discipline and
morale in the armed forces."
165
Judicial support for public duty carried over to welfare cases, where recipients were
compelled to work to support their families. Commonwealth v. Pouliot remarked: "[t]he
obligation of a husband and father to maintain his family, if in any way able to do so, is
one of the primary responsibilities established by human nature and by civilized society.
The statute enforces this duty by appropriate sanctions." 166 Continuing in this vein,
Moss v. Superior Court (Ortiz) held a parent in contempt for willfully failing to seek
employment to support his children. The Court believed that "[e]mployment chosen by
the employee which the employee is free to leave, either in favor of another employer or
if the working conditions are objectively intolerable, is simply not akin to peonage."'
167
Table 2A and 2B (Finding 3): Nearly all trial and appellate courts ruled that the
U.S. Constitution did not prohibit government-imposed work duties. Their forceful
tones matched their statistical record of decisiveness.
161. Green Lake County v. Wuapaca County, 89 N.W. 549, 552 (Wis. 1902).
162. Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 447 P.2d 193, 194 (Utah 1968).
Indigent defendants in criminal cases who desire counsel have always been
represented, and the court has always appointed a lawyer for that purpose. The
assignment has been assumed by the lawyer out of respect for the court in which he
serves and out of a sense of responsibility which lawyers feel towards humanity in
general.
Id.
163. State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441,444 (N.J. 1966).
164. 142 F.2d 181,186 (9th Cir. 1943).
165. 272 F.2d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1959).
166. 198 N.E. 256, 257 (Mass. 1935).
167. 950 P.2d 59, 72 (Cal. 1998) ("It does not become so because a person would prefer not to work
but must do so in order to comply with a legal duty to support the person's children.").
2010]
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In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-l-3.1(a) rejected a
challenge to involuntary appointment, concluding that "[f]or the condition of servitude
to be within the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment's prohibition, the person must be subjected
to physical restraint or threat of legal confmement as an alternative to the service." 168 In
dismissing a Thirteenth Amendment challenge by attorneys who were ordered to
represent indigent parents, Family Division Trial Lawyers of Superior Court-D. C., Inc.
v. Moultrie reasoned that "[i]nability to avoid continued service is the essential
ingredient of involuntary servitude."' 169 Williamson v. Vardeman said that attorneys may
be required to represent indigent defendants without pay, noting that the "[T]hirteenth
[A]mendment has never been applied to forbid compulsion of traditional modes of
public service even when only a limited segment of the population is so compelled.'
170
Physicians fared no better than attorneys in making constitutional arguments. In
Bertelsen v. Cooney the "Doctors' Draft Law" was upheld against a Thirteenth
Amendment challenge.171 The court declared, "there is nothing unique in the obligation
to serve. It is quite analogous to, but much more vital, than other obligations to serve in
the public interest.' 72 In a similar ruling rejecting a Thirteenth Amendment claim by a
conscientious objector, United States v. Boardman quoted Justice Cardozo, stating,
"The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of a war .... The right of private judgment has never yet
been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
government."1
73
Table 2A and 2B (Findings 4 and 5): Individuals were moderately successful
when they used a specific law to challenge a work or service duty. Many of these cases
ruled narrowly that that the law was not properly applied to a person's circumstances.
Walker v. Moseley is a case in point.1 74 In a summary proceeding before a local
justice of the peace, a county overseer of highways won a summary proceeding against
someone who ignored a summons to road duty.175 The local justice directed a police
officer to levy on the defendant's property.176 Moseley appealed to a state court on
grounds that the overseer failed to prove that he held his office. 177 The court agreed
with Mosely, stating, "in this case, one of the material facts necessary to the jurisdiction
of the justice, was that the party complaining should be an overseer of the highway....
[T]he person who instituted these proceedings and procured the warrants, must show
the fact that he was an overseer of highways."'
178
168. 573 So.2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1990) (emphasis omitted) ("the amendment does not apply if the
individual may choose freedom even though the consequences of that choice result in some
diminution of economic earning power.").
169. 725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
170. 647 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982).
171. 213 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1954).
172. Id.
173. 419 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1969) (citation omitted).
174. 5 Denio 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
175. Id. at 102.
176. Id. at 103.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 104.
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Bank of Ithaca v. King shows the aggressive enforcement methods to enforce road
duty 179. A county overseer appeared before a local justice to impose a fine upon the
president, directors and company of a bank for failure to appear and work on the
highways. Reversing the local court, New York's Supreme Court narrowly construed
the meaning of person under the road law.180 Citing the statute that requires a person to
receive twenty-four hours notice of his assessment, the court asked, "How can such
notice be served on a corporation? It cannot be served upon the president, or... any
other officer or servant, for the statute does not authorize any such service ... ; nor is it
any part of the duties of such officers or servants to perform such labor."'
181
In rare cases where conscientious objectors prevailed, courts made narrow
procedural rulings. The Seventh Circuit overturned a five-year sentence in Huisinga v.
United States, after the trial judge and draft board failed to take account of new
information showing that the objector had become a full time Jehovah's Witness
minister.182 Reversing a two-year sentence for a Jehovah's Witness in Pate v. United
States, the court ruled that the individual was improperly denied a ministerial
exemption. 183 Other courts used similar reasoning to overrule draft boards or to reverse
convictions.
184
Tables 3A and 3B (Findings 6 and 7): Governments always prevailed when they
sought to imprison individuals for failing to perform road duty or report for a job in lieu
of combat. While few courts addressed imprisonment as a sanction, the issue arose in
United States v. Dudley, a case where an appellate court upheld a five-year sentence for
a Jehovah's Witness who was convicted for failing to report to work.185 In denying
Dudley's motion to reconsider the sentence, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the trial
court's application of uniform sentencing standards outweighed the occasional practice
of court discretion in imposing sentences. 186 Reflecting the trend to sentence
conscientious objectors to five years in prison for refusing work orders, the appellate
court in United States v. Griffin took a rare stance in voicing concern about the severity
of this sentence.
187
179. 12 Wend. 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
180. Id. (noting that corporations are persons for purposes of levying taxes, but road duty requires
personal service). The court added that the "labor of the person assessed is as much required as a
personal service as is the performance of military duty." Id. at 393.
181. Id.
182. 422 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1970).
183. 243 F.2d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1957) (stating that when a registrant shows that ministry is his
vocation, "he is entitled, not as a matter of grace but as a matter of right to the statutory
exemption.").
184. Wiggins v. United States, 261 F.2d 113, 119 (5th Cir. 1958) ("Wiggins has shown that he
dedicated himself at an early age to serving Jehovah's Witnesses; that he regarded this endeavor as
his chief purpose in life, the secular employment being incidental."). See also Robertson v. United
States, 404 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasizing that government must play by its own rules, the
court said: "Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government. But the
government in dealing with its citizens owes them an equal obligation to right its angles."). Id. at
1145-46.
185. 436 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1971).
186. Id. at 1059.
187. 434 F.2d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 1970) (Brooks, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the appellate court
decision to remand the sentencing order. The judge explained:
I also disagree with the comment in the Court's opinion relating to the 'severity' of
the sentence imposed in this case. Since, within statutory limitations, the length of a
20101
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IV. ADDRESSING MORAL HAZARD FOR BAILED-OUT HOMEOWNERS:
THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY SERVICE
Moral hazard occurs when there is an "incentive for someone to behave badly
because he is insulated from the consequences of his actions."1 88 The concept
originated in private insurance contracts. An early Aetna Insurance Guide warned that
"the insured should never make money by a loss. The contract should never be so
arranged, that under any circumstances it would be profitable to the insured to meet
with disaster. Any other arrangement is offering a premium for carelessness and
roguery."' 89 This shows how insurance incentives can bring "out the bad in otherwise
good people."'190 More recently, moral hazard has been applied to government policies
that insure private risks.
191
I now demonstrate how moral hazard played a role in the mortgage crisis. I also
contend that the United States Treasury's mortgage relief programs create a new moral
hazard. Following this discussion, I suggest how the United States could address this
problem by requiring aid recipients in the Treasury's mortgage programs to perform
community service.
A. The Mortgage Crisis Created Unusual Moral Hazards
A recent GAO study shows how moral hazard led to the mortgage crisis.
192
Starting in 2003, Alternative Mortgage Products (AMPs) became popular. These loans
were aimed at less creditworthy borrowers. 1 93 One AMP allowed the borrower to make
only interest payments to keep the loan current, while another had a low teaser rate that
allowed the borrower to finance a purchase before the rate adjusted to a higher level.
194
sentence lies solely within the discretion of the district judge, I do not think an
appellate court should undertake to comment upon its reasonableness. A district
judge has before him all the necessary information upon which to base a proper
exercise of discretion, whereas an appellate court does not.).
Id. at 744.
188. Bearbull, Tackling Hazards, INVESTORS CHRONICLE, Mar. 27-Apr. 2, 2009, at 19. Moral hazard is
created by risk sharing contracts or public policies that discourage individuals from avoiding costly
behaviors.
189. Tom Baker, On the Geneology of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237, 250 (1996).
190. Id. at 251.
191. For early studies that develop the moral hazard idea, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963); Richard Zeckhauser, Medical
Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives, 2 J. ECON.
THEORY 10 (1970); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection,
80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972); and Mark V. Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The
Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44 (1974).
192. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-06-1021, Alternative Mortgage Products: Impact on
Defaults Remains Unclear but Disclosure of Risks to Borrowers Could be Improved (Sept. 2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov.new.items/d061021.pdf.
193. Id. at 4.
194. Id. at 1.
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These loans fostered irresponsible credit behaviors. Borrowers were allowed to
defer repayment of principal and interest for several years.195 This increased the
borrower's debt without ascertaining his ability to pay off growing loan balances. The
GAO concluded that borrowers turned to AMPs to "purchase homes they might not be
able to afford with a conventional fixed-rate mortgage." 196 By 2008, nearly 20% of sub-
prime loans were delinquent.
197
As the volume of these mortgages grew, more borrowers were unable to pay these
loans in the long run.198 But the risk of default remained a hidden problem while
housing prices climbed, because these borrowers were able to refinance their loans.
199
Once the explosive growth in home values reversed course in 2006, falling prices set off
a major correction in the housing market. 200 Many borrowers could not refinance their
mortgages because their loans were greater than their home values. 20 1 By late 2007,
some low equity borrowers abandoned their homes when they fell far behind on
payments.
20 2
As foreclosures grew, plummeting bank balance sheets led to a deep recession.
20 3
Homeowners could have been left to suffer the consequences of their poor credit
decisions. The U.S. intervened, however, because policy makers feared harmful
spillover effects from millions of foreclosures.
20 4
B. The Treasury Department's Mortgage Relief Programs: New Moral Hazard
The U.S. Treasury Department's "Making Home Affordable Program" addresses
the housing crisis by providing nine million Americans with more affordable
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Todd J. Zywicki, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2009).
198. Press Release, Statement by Sec'y Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Comprehensive Approach to Mkt.
Devs. (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp149.htm.
199. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 5, 7-8 (2009). See also Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., The Evolution of a Suitability Standard in the
Mortgage Lending Industry: The Subprime Meltdown Fuels the Fires of Change, 12 N.C. BANKING INST.
21, 44 (2008) (stating mortgage originations exploded from $1 trillion a year to $4 trillion in 2003).
200. Press Release, Remarks by Treasury Sec'y Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Housing and Capital
Mkts. before the N.Y. Soc'y of Secs. Analysts (an. 7, 2008), available at
http:/ / www.ustreas.gov/press/ releases/hp757.htm.
201. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-78R, DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS
(Oct. 16, 2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0878r.pdf (informing Congress that
the decline in housing prices may have provided disincentives to borrowers to keep paying their
mortgages while making it more difficult to refinance or sell so as to avoid default or foreclosure).
202. Carl Prine, The Subprime Mortgage Mess: 5 Myths to Put to Rest, P1TrSBURGH TRIB. REV., Feb. 10,
2008 (stating that according to a study of the Mortgage Bankers Association, lenders initiated
384,000 foreclosures the third quarter of 2007, and in more than half these cases, the borrowers
received either modified loans or new repayment plans. The remainder "either abandoned their
homes or didn't respond to foreclosure notices, leaving banks no option but to seize the
properties.").
203. See Testimony by Sec'y of Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr. before the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities,





mortgages.20 5 The program has two elements-one to refinance, 20 6 and the other to
modify,207 loans.
By offering to lend money at 125% of the current value of a home, the refinance
program targets borrowers who put little or no money down on their home purchase.
20 8
The program also lends to borrowers who took out a second mortgage, even if
combined debt under the first and second mortgages exceeds 105% of the home
value.
209
Thus, the program targets a broad swath of higher-risk borrowers. It applies to first
mortgages that are held by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. This rewards corporations
whose loose underwriting standards caused the U.S. to seize them in 2008.210
The refinance program benefits a homeowner by keeping him in his home with a
lower mortgage payment. The government loan pays off his more expensive loan. The
Treasury's mortgage modification program provides additional relief to borrowers. It
differs from the refinancing program by postponing or forgiving debt. 211 Taxpayer
dollars create incentives for new mortgage issuers to make loans with annual interest
rates as low as 2%.212 Government incentives allow lenders to lengthen loan maturities
from thirty years to forty years.213 Two policy features seem especially generous. If a
borrower fails to qualify for a forty year amortization loan, the program provides
principal forbearance-that is, temporary deferral of the borrower's payment.214 In
addition, the policy allows forgiveness of part of the debt.
215
Critics say that the modification program creates moral hazard by rewarding
borrowers who took on too much debt.216 They also believe that current debt relief
programs pile new moral hazards on the original ones that led to the credit crisis. One
critic suggests that "moral hazard sends a clear message to the American people: The
worse the behavior, the greater the reward. '21 7 Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize economist,
cautions that safety nets for borrowers who are thought to be too big to fail reward bad
205. See United States. Department of Treasury, Making Home Affordable, supra note 2, at 1.
206. See United States Department of Treasury, Fact Sheet: Financial Stability Plan, supra note 5, at 1-
4.
207. See id. at 5-12.
208. See id. at 2.
209. See id. at 5-6.
210. James R. Hagerty & T.W. Farnam. Freddie's CFO an Apparent Suicide, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2009,
at A3.
211. See United States Department of Treasury, supra note 5, at 5.
212. Id. at 7.
213. See id. at 8.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. John C. Coffee Jr., A Systematic Risk Regulator? WAho, What, and Why?, N. Y. LAW J., Mar. 19,
2009, at 5. Similarly, critics argue that direct government intervention into the refinancing of loans
would reward irresponsible behavior and create moral hazard. See Edmund L. Andrews,
Washington Lends a Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at C1 (describing a proposal by Bank of America
advocating a massive federal intervention by creating a Federal Homeowner Preservation
Corporation to "buy up billions of dollars in troubled mortgages at a deep discount"); and Ronald
D. Utt, President's Homeownership Proposals Should Be Sent Back to the Drawing Board, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION WEB MEMO (Feb. 7, 2008) http://
www.heritage.org/Research/Economy/upload/wm_1802.pdf.
217. See Bearbull, supra note 188, at 19.
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risks and punish prudent behaviors. 218 A 2009 GAO Hearing sees moral hazard in the
Treasury's mortgage relief program: new loans might cause borrowers who would
otherwise not default to fall behind on mortgage payments in the expectation of being
bailed-out.
219
The Treasury Department has a third program that finances shorts sales, whereby a
borrower-with lender approval- sells a home for less than the amount due on the
loan. 220 The program is intended to help hundreds of thousands of borrowers who
cannot qualify for a mortgage modification, and face certain foreclosure. 221 The
Treasury Department promises to pay mortgage servicing companies up to $1000, and
borrowers up to $1500, for executing short sales.
222
Short sales lower the transaction cost in transferring title from a foreclosed
borrower to a lender. The program is controversial because it frees borrowers from
paying any deficiency on the difference between the home's resale value and the
amount due on the loan.223 Referring to this moral hazard, Thomas Lawer, a housing
economist, observed that "giving borrowers money to encourage selling their homes
without having to repay their debt is a slap in the face to everyone else."
224
C. Mortgage Debt Relief and the Feasibility of Compulsory Community Service
My research shows that federal and state governments required individuals to pay a
literal or metaphorical debt to society by performing mandatory public service. I
suggest that these experiences pave the way for the United States to require community
service as a means to reduce moral hazard in the Treasury Department's mortgage relief
programs.
Consider, for example, the simple proposal that a government subsidized mortgage
modification would require a recipient to work for 200 hours in a local Habitat for
Humanity program. This policy would enable cash strapped individuals to repay their
debt subsidy with labor. Individual sacrifice would address a root problem of moral
hazard-taking personal responsibility for the consequences of a bad decision whose
costs are displaced on government insurance. Other community service might involve
work in literacy programs, mentoring students, companion programs for the elderly, or
community beautification projects-to suggest a few possibilities.
How would the United States identify and coordinate with social services
organizations? The nation dealt with this issue when it compelled conscientious
218. Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? Examining the Systemic Threats of Large Financial Institutions:
Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize
recipient and professor at Columbia Univ.), available at
http://jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.HearingsCalendar&ContentRecord_id=c89
b185b-5056-8059-7670-Oce56df64713&Regon-id=&Issueid - .
219. TARP Oversight: Warrant Repurchases and Protecting Taxpayers: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations, lllthCong. (2009) (statement of Thomas J. McCool, Director of the
Center for Economics, Government Accountability Office).







objectors to accept employment that contributed to national health, safety, or interest.
225
The draft law stated specific criteria for types of work that would satisfy a public
service obligation. 226 Conscientious objectors were assigned to hospitals or government
agencies.227 More recently, the federal government has experience under the NHSC
program in assigning jobs that assist underserved areas. 228 State welfare laws match aid
recipients to appropriate work assignments,229 and determine schedules for
recipients.
230
In sum, I do not advocate a specific community service program but suggest
Habitat for Humanity to provide context for addressing new moral hazard in mortgage
aid policies. Individual responsibility would be promoted by requiring aid recipients to
give back to their communities in return for receiving debt relief. My research also
suggests that this policy is feasible, and faces no major legal hurdle. Compulsory
service has been ordered in the United States since the early 1800s. It has been required
of paupers and public aid recipients- people who experienced dire financial
circumstances akin to current debtors. And the requirement has been imposed in
national emergencies, similar to the crisis that has caused the United States to bail-out
millions of homeowners.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY THE LAW DISTINGUISHES COMPULSORY SERVICE AND
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Government ordered work assignments were challenged on numerous legal
grounds and usually failed. Courts overwhelmingly rejected the suggestion that these
compulsions violated the Thirteenth Amendment or laws against peonage. This
outcome is explained by the judiciary's narrow interpretation of involuntary servitude.
On one hand, Congress broadened involuntary servitude to apply to sex trafficking
victims231 and enslaved immigrants.232 But the Supreme Court has not interpreted
servitude beyond congressionally specified examples.
In a key 1988 ruling, United States v. Kozminski,233 the Court reaffirmed the
vitality of the public duty doctrine. A married couple who provided squalid housing to
mentally challenged farm hands scared them into thinking that they could not leave the
premises. 234 The U.S. successfully prosecuted the couple by arguing that the farm hands
worked as psychological hostages. 235 But Kozminski rejected this approach by limiting
225. See Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. § 4560) (1958).
226. United States v. Crouch, 415 F.2d 425, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1969).
227. E.g. United States v. Harris, 446 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1971); Badger v. United States, 322 F.2d
902, 908 (9th Cir. 1963).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 254e (2006).
229. Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39,41-42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
230. Id. at 42.
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 1582 (2006) (2006).
233. United States v. Kozminksi, 487 U.S. 931 (1988). It is a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2006) to
hold another person to involuntary servitude.
234. Id. at 934. The Kozminskis threatened the two workers -both of whom had IQ scores under
70- with institutionalization if they left the farm. Id.
235. Id. at 936-37.
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involuntary servitude to situations involving physical or legal coercion. 236 Notably, the
opinion upheld key exceptions to involuntary servitude.
2 37
Kozminski built on Butler v. Perry,238 a major precedent that coincided with the
draft in World War I. The significance of Butler cannot be dismissed even though road
duty has long been abolished. The Court embraced the public duty doctrine, trinoda
necessitas.239 Today, courts apply Butler and its motivating doctrine by upholding
community service mandates for high school graduation.
240
To be clear, trinoda necessitas was not often cited in my database, but its reasoning
pervaded various public policies in these cases. In Rome, trinoda necessitas meant that
all free men were required to participate in empire building duties. In the U.S., courts
specifically cited the doctrine in road work cases. But it is also easy to see how this
rationale applied to conscientious objectors-free men whose conscience did not permit
combat but whose nation demanded an equivalent form of civilian sacrifice. Similar
reasoning applied to lawyers who served the public by working without pay. 241
My research also shows that compulsory service requires a compelling and
overarching government interest-plus an egalitarian ethos that justifies its imposition.
The mortgage relief program meets these conditions. In an age of personal and
corporate sacrifice, this handout perpetuates the spendthrift mentality that dug the
nation's deep financial hole. My study puts this government largess in historical
context. The mortgage subsidies in the Treasury Department's programs reflect the
Judaic concept of unconditional debt forgiveness. By this lofty precept, once a debtor
cannot pay his obligation, it is good for society to wipe his slate clean. There is wisdom
in allowing hopeless debtors to start anew-but why is no thought given to a policy of
requiring bailed out homeowners to pay back part of their debt relief by serving their
communities? The fact that millions of distressed homeowners have too little money to
pay on their mortgages does not mean they lack time, labor, and skills to share with
their neighbors.
236. See id. at 946-47. While these terms are vague, they were more clearly revealed by the historical
context of the Thirteenth Amendment and § 1584. Congress intended to outlaw the padrone system,
and other forms of exploitation that take "advantage of the special vulnerabilities of their victims,
placing them in situations where they were physically unable to leave." Id. at 948.
237. Id. at 943-44, emphasizing that "the Court has recognized that the prohibition against
involuntary servitude does not prevent the State or Federal Governments from compelling their
citizens, by threat of criminal sanction, to perform certain civic duties."
238. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
239. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943-44 (1988).
240. Steirer by Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1993); Immediato by
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 873 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
241. See State ex. rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64,65-66 (Mo. 1981):
The term 'profession,' it should be borne in mind, as a rule is applied to a group of
people pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service
where economic rewards are definitely an incidental, though under the existing
economic conditions undoubtedly a necessary by-product. In this a profession
differs radically from any trade or business which looks upon money-making and
personal gain as its primary purpose. The lawyer cannot possibly get away from
the fact that his is a public task.
20101
Journal of Legislation
APPENDIX: TABLE OF CASES IN THE EMPIRICAL DATABASE
Acko v. Brown, 489 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1980).
Atherton v. United States, 176 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1949).
Arkansas County v. Freeman, 31 Ark. 266 (1876).
Bacon v. County of Wayne, 1 Mich. 461 (1850).
Badger v. United States, 322 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1963).
Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
Bank of Ithaca v. King, 12 Wend. 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
Barrow v. Hepler, 34 La.Ann. 362 (1892).
Bertelson v. Cooney, 213 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1954).
Biss v. Town of New Haven, 42 Wis. 605 (1877).
Bjorson v. United States, 272 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1959).
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919).
Bouton v. Neilson, 3 Johns 474 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).
Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990).
Brooks v. United States 147 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1945).
Brown v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Brukhman v. Guiliani, 705 N.Y.S.2d 558 (N.Y. 2000).
Buffalo & B. Plank-Road Co. v. Town of Lancaster Highway Comm'rs, 10 How. Pr.
237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854).
Buongiomo v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Burlington & M.R.R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 4 Neb. 293 (1876).
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
Camp v. United States, 413 F.2d 419 (11 th Cir. 1969).
Carpenter v. Dane, 9 Wis. 274 (1859).
Case v. Bd. of Comm's, 4 Kan. 511 (1868).
Chidsey v. Town of Scranton, 12 So. 545 (Miss. 1893).
City of Macomb v. Twaddle, 4 Il1.App. 254 (App. Ct. 1879).
City of Marlborough v. City of Lowell, 10 N.E.2d 104 (Mass. 1937).
City of Taunton v. Talbot, 71 N.E. 785 (Mass. 1904).
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L.Ry. Co. v. Randle, 55 N.E. 728 (Ill. 1899).
Com. v. Colley Township Supervisors, 29 Pa. 121 (1858).
Commonwealth v. Pouliot, 198 N.E. 256 (Mass. 1935).
Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947).
Daniels v. United States, 372 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1967) (Daniels I).
Daniels v. United States, 404 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1968) (Daniels II).
Davis v. United States, 400 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1968).
Dearing v. Heard, 15 Me. 247 (1839).
Delgado v. Milwaukee County, 611 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
Dennis v. Simon, 36 N.E. 832 (1894).
DeTavernier v. Hunt, 53 Tenn. 599 (1871).
Dingman v. United States, 156 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1946).
Dismukes v. Bd. of Supervisors, 58 Miss. 612 (1881).
Dixon v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 156 S.E. 852 (N.C. 1931).
Elam v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 348 (1873).
Ex Parte Brown, 288 P.2d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
Ex Parte Roberts, 11 S.W. 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889).
Ex Parte Todd, 50 P. 1071 (Cal. 1871).
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
Ferguson v. Moore, 5 Pa.Super. 353 (Super. Ct. 1897).
[Vol. 36:139
The Inequality of Sacrifice
Fitts v. United States, 334 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1964).
Frank v. United States, 236 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1951).
Foster v. United States, 384 F.2d 372 (11 th Cir. 1967)
Fox v. City of Rockford, 38 Ill. 451 (1865).
Galoway v. State, 202 S.W.76 (Tenn. 1918).
Gourley v. State, 129 P. 684 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913).
Greer v. United States, 378 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1967).
Hall v. United States, 437 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1971).
Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850).
Harper (Collector) v. Broosher, 240 S.W. 729 (Ark. 1922).
Hopper v. United States, 142 U.S. 181 (9th Cir. 1943).
House v. Whitis, 64 Tenn. 690 (1875).
Howze v. United States, 272 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1959).
Huisinga v. United States, 422 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1970).
In re Ascue, 2002 WL 192561 (W.D. Va. 2002).
In re Dassler, 35 Kan. 678 (1886).
In re Dillingham, 104 B.R. 505 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
In re Jennings, 184 Cal.Rptr. 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
In re Owens, 82 B.R. 960 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
James v. Clarke County, 33 Ala. 51 (1858).
Johnson v. Scott, 114 S.W. 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908).
Johnson v. United States, 285 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1960).
Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 Ill. 22 (1884).
Johnston v. City of Macon, 62 Ga. 645 (1879).
Johnston v. Lewis & Clarke County, 2 Mont. 159 (1874).
Jones v. United States, 387 F.2d 909 (1 Ith Cir. 1968).
Kelley v. Andrew County, 43 Mo. 338 (1869).
Kramer v. United States, 147 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1945).
Lamont v. Solano County, 49 Cal. 158 (1874).
LaPorte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1962).
Lawrence v. State, 161 So. 260 (Ala. 1935).
Leedy v. Town of Bourbon, 40 N.E. 640 (1895).
Lewin v. State, 77 Ala. 45 (1884).
Loewing v. United States, 392 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1968).
Lowery v. State, 12 S.W. 563 (Ark. 1889).
Lower Bd. of Comm's of Rds. v. Guerard, 1 Speers 215 (S.C. 1843).
Mathews v. Pineo, 19 F.3d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1994).
Matyasik v. United States, 392 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1968).
McDonald v. County of Madison, 43 I11. 22 (1867).
Merritt v. United States, 401 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1968).
Miller v. Gorman, 38 Pa. 309 (1861).
Morris v. Town of Greenwood, 19 So. 105 (Miss. 1905).
Moss v. Super. Ct. (Ortiz), 950 P.2d 59 (Cal. 1998).
Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct.CI. 173 (Ct. Cl. 1864).
New York Dep't of State Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
Noble v. Clark, 1908 WL 554 (Ohio 1908).
O'Connor v. United States, 415 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1969).
People ex rel. Ransom v. Bd. of Supervisors, 78 N.Y. 622 (N.Y. 1879).
People ex rel. Whedon v. Bd. of Supervisors, 183 N.Y.S. 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920).
Pomorski v. United States, 222 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1955).
Posey v. Mobile County, 50 Ala. 6 (1873).
Presby v. Klickitat County, 31 P. 876 (1892).
2010]
Journal of Legislation
Probst v. Calhoun County Ct., 106 S.E. 878 (W.Va. 1921).
Robertson v. United States, 404 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1968).
Roodenko v. United States, 147 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1944).
Rendleman v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 1537, 1539 (9th Cir. 1988).
Rendleman v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1994).
Ruckenbrod v. Millins, 133 P.2d 325 (1943).
Sanders v. Levi, 7 So. 692 (La. 1890).
Sawyer v. Alton, 4 111. 127 (1841).
Short v. State, 80 Md. 392 (1895).
Sims v. Hutcheson, 72 Ga. 437 (1884).
Soc. Investigator Eligibles Ass'n v. Taylor, 197 N.E. 262 (N.Y. 1935).
State v. Covington, 34 S.E. 272, 272 (N.C. 1899).
State v. Byers, 134 P. 234 (N.M. 1913).
State v. Cauble, 70 N.C. 62 (1874).
State v. Halifax, 15 N.C. 345 (1883).
State v. Hathcock, 20 S.C. 419 (1884).
State v. Johnston, 23 S.E. 921 (N.C. 1896).
State v. Porter, 32 N.E. 1021 (Ind. 1893).
State v. Rayburn, 101 Pac. 1029 (Okla. Crim. App. 1909).
State v. Sharp, 34 S.E. 264 (N.C. 1899).
State v. Simmons, 10 So. 382 (La. 1892).
State v. Wheeler, 141 N.C. 773 (1906).
State v. Witherspoon, 75 N.C. 222 (1876).
Tarkington v. McShea, 2 Jones 47 (N.C. 1854).
Taylor v. State, 41 So. 776 (Ala. 1906).
Taylor v. United States, 285 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1960).
Toone v. State, 178 Ala. 70 (1912).
Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 490 (1863).
Town of Starksborough v. Town of Hinesboro, 13 Vt. 215 (1841).
United States v. Armstrong, 784 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
United States v. Bartell, 144 F. Supp. 793 (D.C.N.Y. 1956).
United States v. Bills, 639 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.J. 1986).
United States v. Bloom, 112 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1969).
United States v. Boroski, 412 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1969).
United States v. Bums, 450 F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1971).
United States v. Carlson, 248 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D. Wis. 1965).
United States v. Casias, 306 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1969).
United States v. Chaudron, 425 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Chodorski, 240 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1957).
United States. v. Clark, 307 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1962).
United States v. Copeland, 126 F. Supp. 734 (D. Conn. 1954).
United States v. Crouch, 415 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1969).
United States. v. Diercks, 223 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1955).
United States v. Dillon, 294 F. Supp. 38 (D. Or. 1968).
United States v. Dudley, 436 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1971).
United States v. Dyer, 272 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. W.Va. 1967).
United States v. Elizarraraz, 400 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1968).
United States v. Emery, 168 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1948).
United States v. Fielder, 136 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
United States v. Fowler, 659 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
United States. v. Gary, 963 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 36:139
The Inequality of Sacrifice
United States v. Gidmark, 440 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1971).
United States v. Goodman, 435 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970).
United States v. Gormly, 136 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1943).
United States v. Griffin, 434 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1970).
United States v. Haithco, 644 F. Supp. 63 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
United States v. Hamilton, 322 F. Supp. 1214 (D.C. La. 1970).
United States v. Harris, 446 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1971).
United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Hawver, 437 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1971).
United States v. Hayes, 633 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
United States v. Heljenek, 275 F. Supp. 579 (D.C. Pa. 1967).
United States v. Henderson, 223 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1955).
United States v. Hoepker, 223 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1955).
United States v. Hogans, 253 F. Supp. 409 (D.C.N.Y. 1966).
United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1967).
United States v. Hugelmeyer, 774 F. Supp. 559 (D. Ariz. 1991).
United States v. Huisinga, 422 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1970).
United States v. Hurt, 244 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1957).
United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1966).
United States v. Kekich, 463 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1972).
United States v. Kephart, 170 B.R. 787 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
United States v. Kidson, 315 F. Supp. 132 (D.N.H. 1970).
United States v. Kokayi, 968 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
United States v. Kuehnau, 349 F. Supp. 1323 (D.C. Wis. 1972).
United States v. Kushmer, 365 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1966).
United States v. Kutz, 199 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
United States v. Lebherz, 129 F. Supp. 444 (D.C.N.J. 1955).
United States v. Ledwith, 998 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Lyzun, 444 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1971).
United States v. Maldonado, 867 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
United States v. Martin, 710 F. Supp. 271 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
United States v. Milligan, 457 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1972).
United States v. Mohammed, 288 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1961).
United States v. Mroz, 136 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1943).
United States v. Niles, 220 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1955).
United States v. Palmer, 327 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
United States v. Pate, 243 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1957).
United States v. Phillips, 423 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1970).
United States v. Ransom, 223 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1955).
United States v. Ream, 491 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Redovan, 656 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
United States. v. Robin, 419 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1969).
United States v. Rogers, 454 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1971).
United States v. Roper, 681 F. Supp. 77 (D. Me. 1988).
United States v. Simson, 135 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
United States v. Slattendale, 168 F. Supp. 574 (D. Colo. 1958).
United States. v. Smith, 124 F. Supp. 406, aftd in United States. v. Hoepker, 223 F.2d
921 (7th Cir. 1955).
United States v. Stepler, 258 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1958).
United States v. Stewart, 322 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1963).
United States v. Stidham, 248 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
United States v. Sutter, 127 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
20101
Journal of Legislation
United States v. Tettenburn, 186 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1960).
United States v. Thorn, 317 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. La. 1970).
United States. v. Tichenor, 403 F.2d 986 (6th Cir. 1968).
United States v. Turner, 660 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
United Statesv. Van Den Berg, 139 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1944).
United States v. Vanhom, 20 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Willis, 409 F.2d 830 (11 th Cir. 1969).
United States v. Zieber, 240 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1957).
Varner v. Thompson, 60 S.E. 216 (Ga. 1908).
Vise v. Hamilton County, 19 Ill. 78 (1857).
Walker v. Moseley, 5 Denio 102 (N.Y. Sup. 1847).
Wallace v. Bradshaw, 29 A. 156 (N.J. 1894).
Walling v. State, 232 S.W. 1115 (Tex. 1921).
Ward v. State, 7 So. 298 (Ala. 1890).
Washoe County v. Humboldt County, 14 Nev. 123 (1879).
Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99 (1879).
Weightman v. United States, 142 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1944).
Whicher v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Cedar County, 1 Greene 217 (Iowa 1848).
Whitt v. City of Gadsen, 49 So. 682 (Ala. 1909).
Wiggins v. United States, 261 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1958).
Willaford v. Pickle, 81 Tenn. 672 (Tenn. 1884).
Winfield Township ex rel. Patton v. Wise, 73 Ind. 71 (1880).
Wolfe v. United States, 149 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1945).
Woolard v. McCullough, 1 Ired. 432 (N.C. 1841).
Wood v. Inhabitants of Waterville, 5 Mass. 294 (1809).
Wood v. United States, 373 F.2d 894 (1 1th Cir. 1967).
Yaich v. United States, 283 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1960).
Yarbrough v. Super. Ct., 197 Cal.Rptr. 737 (Cal. App. 1. Dist. 1983).
[Vol. 36:139
